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There are many ways to skin the cat
(English saying)
I.INTRODUCTION
In comparative law, there are many situations where the same legal term has
different meanings, or where different legal terms have same legal effect. This
can often cause confusion to both lawyers and their clients. This confusion most
often occurs when civil lawyers have to deal with common law, or aice aersa,
when common law lawyers deal with civil law issues. While there are many
issues which are dealt with in the same way by the civil law and common law
systems, there remain also significant differences between these two legal sys-
tems related to legal structure, classification, fundamental concepts, terminolo-
gY, etc.
* I am grateful for useful comments and suggestions to Lorenz Kodderitzsch, Mark Fenwick,
Takuya Hatta and Stefan Vogl. Naturally I remain liable for all eventual errors in this paper.
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This paper will not deal with theoretical examination of differences between
the common law and the civil law, but will focus rather on various distinctive
features of civil law and common law, with several illustrations of resulting dif-
ferences in both substantive law and procedural law. There is a great num6er of
these differences and all of them, of course, cannot be dealt withln a short study
of limited scope as this one. Even the books on comparative law which havl
extensively examined the differences between the civil law and the common law
could not cover all those differences.'Any attempt to make a selection of differ-
ences between the civil law and the common law on the basis of their importance
would be difficult. Hence, this paper will review only several typical elamples
of differences between the civil law and the common law, both in substantive
law and civil procedure. These differences will not be examined in detail as they
should serve only as illustration of those differences.
The scope of this paper will be mainly focused on the civil law issues and will
not deal with other areas of law In order to emphasize distinctive features of
common law system and civil law system, some important differences which
exist within these two "families" (e.g. differences between American and English
law, or differences between French and German law) will not be examined and
it will be assumed that all common law systems are alike in essential respects,
and that all civil law systems are also alike in essential respects.2 The papei will
not enter into polemic as to which legal system is better and what are the advan-
tages of common law or of civil law The purpose of this short study is simply to
highlight some of the main conceptual differences between common law and
civil law systems, and to explore the possibilities of reconciling of some of those
differences.
II. CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW COMPARED
Notion of Civil Law
Civil law has its origin in Roman law, as codified in the Corpus Iuris Civilis
of Justinian. Under this influence, in the ensuing period the civil law has been
K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, INTRODUCION IO COMPARATM LAW (3rd Ed. Clarendon
Press - Oxford 1998); R. B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATM LAW (Mineola, New York,
t998); J.H. MERRYMAN, THE CMLL LAW IRADIIION: 1N INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSIEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMENCA
(2nd Ed. Stanford University Press, 1985); M. A. GLENDON ET AL., COMPAMTM LEGAL
TRADITIONS (West Publishin g Co., 799 4).
According to Zimmermann there are "as many legal systems as there are national states." See,
R. Zimmermann, Savigny's Legacy Legal History, Comparative Law, and the Emergence of a
European Legal Science, LQR 580 (1990.
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developed in Continental Europe and in many other parts of the world. The
main feature of civil law is that it is contained in civil codes,3 which are described
as a "systematic, authoritative, and guiding statute of broad coverage, breathing
the spirit of reform and marking a new start in the legal life of an entire nation."a
Most civil codes were adopted in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: French
Code Civil, 1804, Austrian Brirgerliches Gesetzbuch, 1811, German Biirgerliches
Gesetzbuch, 7896, |apanese Minpo, 1896, Swiss Zivilgesetzbuch, 1907,Italian
Codice Civile, 1,942, etc. Between these codes there are some important differ-
ences, and they are often grouped in the Romanic and the Germanic families.
Even though the civil codes of different countries are not homogenous, there are
certain features of all civil codes which bind them together and "sets them apart
from those who practice under different systems."s
Civil law is largely classified and structured and contains a great number of
general rules and principles, often lacking details. One of the basic characteris-
tics of the civil law is that the courts main task is to apply and interpret the law
contained in a code, or a statute to case facts. The assumption is that the code
regulates all cases that could occur in practice, and when certain cases are not
regulated by the code, the courts should apply some of the general principles
used to fill the gaps.u
Notion of Common Law
Common law evolved in England since around the 11th century and was
later adopted in the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other countries
of the British Commonwealth. The most obvious distinction between civil law
and common law systems is that a civil law system is a codified system, where-
as the common law is not created by means of legislation but is based mainly on
case law The principle is that earlier judicial decisions, usually of tfre higher
courts, made in a similar case, should be followed in the subsequent cases, i.e.
that precedents should be respected. This principle is known as stare decisis and
has never been legislated but is regarded as binding by the courts, which can
The term "civil law" has two meanings: in its narrow meaning it designates the law related to
the areas covered by the civil codes, while broader meaning of civil law relates to the legal sys-
tems based on codes as contrasted to the common law system. In this paper the broader mean-
ing of civil law shall be used.
R. B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., sltpra notel at271..
Id. at.282.
E.g. Italian Civil Code art. 1,2para.2 provides that "if a controversy cannot be decided by a pre-
cise provision, consideration is given to provisions that regulate similar cases or analogous mat-
ters; if the case still remains in doubt, it is decided according to the general principles of the
legal order of the State." Similar provision is contained in art. 4 of the French Code Civil.
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even decide to modify it.?
The claim that common law is created by the case law is only partly true, as
the common law is based in large part on statutes, which the ludges are sup-
posed to apply and interpret in much the same way as the judges in civil law
(e.g. the Sale of Coods Act,7979, the Uniform Commercial Code, etc.).
Comparison Between Civil Law and Common Law
The common law and civil law systems are the products of two fundamen-
tally different approaches to the legal process. In civil law, the main principles
and rules are contained in codes and statutes, which are applied by the courts
codes. Hence, codes and stafutes prevail, while case law constifutes only a sec-
ondary source of law. On the other hand, in the common law system, the law has
been dominantly created by judicial decisions, while a conceptual structure is
often lacking. This difference is the result of different role of legislator in civil
law and common law. The civil law is based on the theory of separation of pow-
ers, whereby the role of legislator is to legislate, while the courts should apply
the law. On ihe other hand, in common law the courts are given the main task in
creating the law
The civil law is based on codes which contain logically connected concepts
and rules, starting with general principles and moving on to specific rules. A
civil lawyer usually starts from a legal norm contained in a legislation, and by
means of deduction makes conclusions regarding the actual case. On the other
hand, a lawyer in common law starts with the actual case and compares it with
the same or similar legal issues that have been dealt with by courts in previous-
ly decided cases, and from these relevant precedents the binding legal rule is
determined by means of induction. A consequence of this fundamental differ-
ence between the two systems is that lawyers from the civil law countries tend
to be more conceptual, while lawyers from the common law countries are con-
sidered to be more pragmatic.
One of the main differences between the civil law and common law systems
is the binding force of precedents. While the courts in the civil law system have
as their main task deciding particular cases by applying and interpreting legal
norms, in the common law the courts are supposed not only to decide disputes
between particular parties but also to provide guidance as to how similar dis-
' There is a distinction in the way the stare declsis doctrine is applied by American and English
courts. In the United States, under this doctrine a lower court is required to follow the decision
of a higher court in the same jurisdiction. In England, the previous rule under which courts
were bound by their own prior decisions was reversed by the House of Lords (Practice
Statement, which declared that it considered itself no longer formally bound by its own prece-
dents and announced its intention "to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to
do so." [7966] 1WLR1234.
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putes should be settled in the future. The interpretation of a legislation given by
a court in specific case is binding on lower courts, so that under common law the
court decisions still make the basis for interpretation of legislation.
On the other hand, in contrast to common law, the case law in civil law sys-
tems does not have binding force. The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to
civil law courts, so that court decisions are not binding on lower courts in sub-
sequent cases, nor are they binding on the same courts, and it is not uncommon
for courts to reach opposite conclusions in similar cases. In civil law the courts
have the task to interpret the law as contained in a legislation, without being
bound by the interpretation of the same legislation given by higher courts; this
means that under civil law the courts do not create the law, but only apply and
interpret it. In practice, howevel, the higher court decisions certainly have a cer-
tain influence on lower courts, since judges of lower courts will usually take into
account the risk that their decisions would probably be reversed by the higher
court if they contradict the higher court decisions. Judges normally try to avoid
the reversal of their decisions by higher courts as if too many of their decisions
are reversed their promotion may be adversely affected. Hence, even though in
civil law systems the case law formally has no binding force, it is generally rec-
ognized that courts should take into account prior decisions, especially when the
settled case law shows that a line of cases has developed.'
III. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
As it is stated in the introduction, there is a great number of differences
between the civil law and the common law and any attempt to make a selection
of those differences on the basis of their importance would be difficult, especial-
ly in a short study as this one. Hence, this paper will review only several typical
examples of differences between the civil law and the common law, without
examining them in detail, as they should serve only as illustration of the diver-
sity of legal concepts characterizing these two legal systems.
Consideration and Causa
In common law a contract has no binding effect unless supported by consid-
eration. The doctrine of consideration essentially means that a contract must be
supported by something of value, such as the promise of a party to provide
goods or services/ or a promise to pay for goods or services.
ll
' M. A. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 1 at 208.
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On the other hand, in civil law a contract cannot exist without a lawful cause
(causa).n Cause is the reason why a party enters a contract and undertakes to per-
form contractual obligations. Cause is different from consideration as the reason
why a party binds himself need not be to obtain something in return.'o For exam-
ple, a party may enter a gratuitous contract which may bind him to perform an
obligation for the benefit of the other party without obtaining any benefit in
return. One of the major practical consequences of the difference between con-
sideration and cause is that common law does not recognize the contracts in
favor of third party beneficiary as only a person who has given consideration
may enforce a contract.
Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties and the Doctrine of Privity of
Contract
In civil law, the parties to a contract may agree that contractual rights can be
transferred to a third party (stipulatio nlteri). For example, sect. 328 of the German
Civil Code provides that "a contract may stipulate performance for the benefit
of a third party, so that the third party acquires the right directly to demand per-
formance."" The right, of course, cannot be forced upon the third party; if the
third party rejects the right acquired under the contract, the right is deemed not
to have been acquired.tt
Common law does not recognize contracts for the benefit of third parties.
Instead, the doctrine of privity of contract applies, which effectively prevents
stipulations in favor of third parties. According to this doctrine, a contract can-
not impose obligations on, or give rights to, anyone other than contracting par-
ties: "only a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it."'3
The doctrine of privity of contract was developed by the common law
because common law focuses more on the issue who is entitled to sue for dam-
ages, rather than who derives rights under the contract. In the last'several
decades this doctrine has caused numerous problems and has proved inconve-
nient to commercial practice. As result, legislation accepting contracts for the
For example, art. 1131 of the French Civil Code provides that "an agreement without cause
or one based on a false or an illicit cause cannot have any effect."
For a discussion of the differences between consideration and causa, see, C. Larroumet,
Detrimental Reliance and Promissory Estoppel as the Cause of Contracts in Louisiana and
Comparative Law, 60 TUL. L. REV, (1986) 1209.
Art. 1121 of the French Civil Code, art. 1411 of the Italian Civil Code, art.112(2) of the Swiss
Code of Obligations, and art 537 of the ]apanese Civil Code contain similar provisions.
For instance, sect. 333 of the German Civil Code.
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benefit of third parties has been adopted in several common law countries.', on
November 71, 1999, at the proposal of the English Law Commission, the
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act received the Royal Assent thereby remov-
ing the doctrine of the privity. 
's This legislation is aimed at introducing contracts
in favor of third parties into English law. The Act sets out the circumstances in
which a third party on whom benefits are conferred may enforce his rights
against the party conferring the benefit.
Revocation of the offer
In comparative law there are differences concerning the possibility to revoke
an offer. In the common law, an offer may always be revoked or varied, in prin-
ciple, until the moment when it was accepted. This applies even to firm offers
which expressly state that they are irrevocable. This is because before acceptance
no consideration is given for these undertakings.l6
In Civil law, in principle, an offer has binding character and can't be revoked
after being given (sect. 145 of the German Civil Code, art. 1328 of the Italian Civil
Code, art. 3 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, art. 521 of the Japanese Civil
Code). Depending on the offer's content, the offeree is bound by the offer for the
period specified therein, or if this period is not specified, then for a reasonable
period. The offer will be considered as revoked if it was not accepted, or it was
not accepted within specified period.
In practice, the differences between the civil law and the common law are not
so great as they may seem. In civil law an offer may be revoked until it reaches
the offeree, while in common law an offer cannot be revoked after being accept-
ed by the offeree. This means that in the common law the offeree bears the risk
of revocation only for the period between the arrival of the offer and the dispatch
of the acceptance, the period during which he is considering whether to accept
or not (which period is usually very short)." Several international instruments
aimed at unification and harmonization of international commercial law have
attempted to bridge these differences by a compromise solution.'8
l4 For instance, New Zealand has adopted Contracts (Privity) Act 1982. Contracts for the ben-
efit of third parties are also accepted in the U.S.A.; see Eisenberg, Third Party Beneficiaries,
92 COLUM.L.REV. 1.258 (1992).
M. Dean, Removing a BIot on the Landscape - The Reform of the Doctrine of Privity, /BL
143 Q000).
K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, supra notel. at357.
K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, supranote 1 at 363.
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Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract
Force majeure has origins in Roman law (ais major) and is later adopted in civil
law system. Force majeure means unforeseen and unexpected event outside the
control of the parties which makes impossible performance of the contract. The
consequence of force majeure is exclusion of liability of a party for non perfor-
mance of the contract.
Common law originally did not recognize the principle that impossibility
excused performance of a contract, as it was based on strict liability: if a super-
vening event occurred during performance of the contract, in order to invoke it,
the parties had to provide expressly in the contract exemption of liability in such
case. Only later in 19th century common law has developed concepts of impos-
sibility of performance and frustration, which operate in a way similar to force
majeure. Under the doctrine of impossibility, a party to a contract is relieved of
the duty to perform when performance has become impossible or totally
impracticable without his or her fault. The effect of frustration is that the contract
is considered terminated at the time of frustrating event and no party is liable for
damages. Differently from the courts in most civil law countries, under the com-
mon law the courts have not the power to adjust or adapt the contract to chang-
ing circumstances.
Differently from civil law, in the common law force majeure does not have a
precisely defined meaning. The parties have to specify in the contract events of
force majeure that will exclude their liability for nonperformance. That is why the
t'orce majeure clauses in common law are often very long and comprehensive try,
ing to cover as many force majeure events as possible.
On the other hand, civil law concept of force majeure does not recognize com-
mercial difficulties as exemption. In that respect, t'orce majeure differs from frus-
tration. Force majeure applies to situations where the performance of contract is
substantially impossible, not merely something different from what wds origi-
nally contemplated by the parties. In the case of substantially changed econom-
ic conditions the doctrine of changed circumstances applies (claunila rebus sic
stantibus).
In civil law systems , force majeure operates independently of party agreement,
which means that it will protect an obligee even if the contract does not contain
a force majetre clause. Since in civil law the liability is based on fault, the party
will not be liable in case of force majeure. On the other hand, in common law force
majeure leads to the termination of the contract and not to exoneration of a party
from liability. In other words, in civil law force majeure is related to the obligation
of one party, whereas in common law it affects the whole contract.re
1'B. Nicholas, Rules and Terms - Civil Law and Common Law,48 TUL.L.REV. 956 (L974).
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Within the European Union there were several attempts at harmonizing the
rules on force majeure. The European Commission has expressed the view that
"force majetre is not limited to absolute impossibility but must be understood in
the sense of unusual circumstances, outside the control of the trader, the conse-
quences of which, in spite of exercise of all due care could not have been avoid-
ed except at the cost of excessive sacrifice."2. However, the Commission makes
clear that the concept of force majeure in European law may not be the same as
that in the national laws of the member states.
Breach of Contract and Fault
The general principles on liability for breach of contract are based on similar
principles in both common law and civil law, but there are some important dif-
ferences related to damages. A fundamental difference between the common law
and civil law concepts related to the recovery of damages for breach of contract
is the requirement of fault in the civil law, whereas this requirement is absent in
the common law.
In common law, fault is not a requirement for breach of contract, and dam-
ages can be awarded without fault. Contract law is "a law of strict liability, and
the accompanying system of remedies operates without regard to fault".2'For
example, under art.260 (2) of the Restatement 2d, "when performance of a duty
under a contract is due, any non-performance is breach". Strict liability for per-
formance of the contract in common law has been softened by the exemption of
liability in the events of impossibility, and changed circumstances.
On the other hand, in civil law countries, existence of fault is the basis for
awarding damages to the innocent party; the recovery of damages can be award-
ed only if the breach of contract is caused at least by negligence.' For example,
sect.276 of the German Civil Code provides that "the debtor is responsible for
deliberate acts and negligence" and under sect. 285 "the debtor is not in default
as long as the performance does not take place because of a circumstance for
which he is not responsible." Hence, the debtor is responsible for damages he
caused intentionally or negligently, but he will not be responsible for damages
that are purely accidental or are caused by force majeure.* Under French law, the
concept of contractual liability based on fault is found in art. 11,47 of. the Civil
Code.
'?o Notice 88/C?59/07; O.J. C259/11'. Also, in the cases 284/82 Bussoni, ECJ 1984 557 and
209 / 83 Valsabbia ECR 1984 3089 , the European Court of Justice has established rules on
force majeure.
r A. FARNSWORTH, CONT&{CTS (Boston-Toronto,1982) 843'
' A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEv, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM (2nd Ed. 1'977) 11'06.
. N. HORN, H. KOTZ & H,G. LESER, GERIfAN PNUATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW
(Clarendon Press - Oxford 1.982) 112'
t5
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This general principle is subject to some important exceptions which provide
for strict liability regardless of fault. Strict liability is introduced by the cbncepts
of contracts that emphasize the manner of performance (Fr. obligations de
moyens), and contracts that specify a given result (Fr. obligations de resultat).ra
obligations de moyens impose a duty to perform certain act without guaranteeing
a promised result; essentially, obligations de moyens correspond to the common
law concepts of "due diligence" and "best efforts".E On the other hand, obtiga-
tions de resultat impose a duty to achieve a promised result. While in case of oblig-
ations de moyens a party claiming damages for breach must prove the fault of the
obligee, in case of obligations de resultat it is sufficient to prove that the promise
made was not performed. It can be concluded that the civil law structure of lia-
bility is opposite of that of common law: it starts from a general principle of lia-
bility based on fault, but this is subject to important exceptions resulting in strict
liability,
Liquidated Damages and Penalties
The common law distinction between liquidated damages and penalties
often causes confusion and creates problems of interpretation. Liquidated dam-
ages and penalty clauses in advance specify the amount of damages for breach
so that an innocent party which suffered damage need not prove its loss in the
case of a breach, and will recover the specified amount of compensation regard-
less of the amount of actual damages. while liquidated damages represent a
genuine pre-estimate of damage, penalties provide for extravagant and exorbi-
tant amount in comparison with the greatest loss which could be caused by the
breach.2u As result liquidated damages are normally enforced by the courts,
while penalties are not.
The common law terms "liquidated damages" and "penalties,, may cause
confusion in civil law, especially in French law, because the French term "clause
penale" and the English term "penalty clause" seem to be similar, but they have
very different meanings." Clause penale specrties the sum of money which is
recoverable by the creditor if the debtor fails to perform his obligations. The
amount specified by clause penale shorid correspond to the estimated loss suf-
26
27
U. DRAETTA, R.B. LAKE & V.P. NANDA, BREACH AND ADAPTATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL CONTR4CTS (Butterworth 7992) 36.
A. Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in Contract
Law,45 U. PIT. L. REV.4 (1984).
CHITTy ON CONTR 4CfS (25th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1983) 958.
On some practical consequences of different concepts of penalty under common law and
civil law, see, R. B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 1 at 681.
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fered by the innocent party. Hence, the correct English translation of clause penale
is "liquidated damages clause" and not "penalty clause"'28 While under common
law the courts do not enforce Penalty clauses which provide for excessive
amount of damages, under civil law the courts may reduce the agreed amount
of damages if that amount is found to be excessive because it contravenes the
principle of good faith, or even increase them, if the amount of liquidated dam-
ages is considered to be too low.2e
Notice of Default
In civil law systems, the general principle is that in case of delayed perfor-
mance of a contract the creditor must put the debtor in default by a notice of
default (Ger. Mnhnung,Fr. mise en demeure). For example, sect. 284 of the German
Civil Code provides that "if after his obligation is due, the debtor does not per-
form after a warning from the creditot he is in default because of the warning..."
The purpose of this notice is to warn the debtor that he is in delay. The notice
may also specify a reasonable time within which the debtor is required to per-
form his obligation (grace period). The notice usually contains a statement of the
claimant that he will not accept performance upon expire of the designated peri-
od. If the debtor fails to undertake action despite the notice, this will assist the
creditor to prove the debtor's fault and recover damages.'o
In common law systems, there is no requirement of notice of default and the
general rule is that performance is due without notice.31 Instead, the debtor is
bound to perform his obligation within reasonable time. For example, Sale of
Goods Act 7979 sect. 29 (3) provides that "where under the contract of sale the
seller is bound to send the goods to the buyer, but no time for sending them is
fixed, the seller is bound to send them within a reasonable time."
Transfer of Property
The rules regulating the transfer of property are different in various national
laws. For example, English, French and German laws treat the transfer of prop-
erty of specific goods in different ways.32
', Benjamin, Penalties, Liquidated Damages and Penal Clauses in Commercial Contracts:
A Comparative Study of English and Continental Law, INT'L. €1 COMP. L. Q. 0960 600.
2s Law No. 85-L097 of Oct.11 1985 and Law No.75-597 ol 9 luly 1'975'
' K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, supra note 1 at 493.
'' G. H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTR/CT (9th Ed. Sweet & Maxwell 199il 743'
.' SCC, A. VON ZIEGLER ET AL., TR/NSFER OF OI AIERSHIP IN /NTERNATIONAL
TRADE (Kluwer, The Hague, 1999)'
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In English law, property in goods is transferred when the parties to the con-
tract intend it to be transferred (Sale of Goods Act sect. 17)." Iiis the intention of
the parties, predominantly of the sellel, which controls when and under what
conditions the property can pass.
In French law, property in goods passes from the seller to the buyer at the
moment when they have agreed about the goods and price (solo consensz), evenlh.glgh the goods are not delivered nor the price paid (Civil Code art. 15g3).
Differently from English law, under French liw thl transfer of property is an
immediate result of the agreement between the parties and the intention of the
parties is irrelevant after that moment.
In cerman law, there are two conditions for the transfer of property: the
1gr:e.mglt of the parties and the delivery of the goods (sect. 929 of the CivilCode). This system is based on Roman law, accordlng to which property could
be transferred if two conditions were fulfilled : the le"gal ground (iistus titulus)
and the method of acquiring the thing (modus acquirenii).ihe tegal ground is the
contract of sale and the way of acquiring is delivery of the goois. For example,
a subsequent buyer of goods may exercile against a seller il contractual rights
which belonged to the original buyer.
Tiust
Trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the per-
son by whom the title to the property is held to equitabie auties io deal with theproperty for the benefit of designated beneficiariei." In principle, the trustee has
the-legal right and the beneficiary the equitable right. i'he trustee is the holder
of the lega.l title_to propertyandhe mayixercise all the powers with respect to
property that a legal owner has, but without right to enjoy the benefits o? o*.r-
ership. on the other hand, the beneficiary has n-o legal tiite to property, but he is
entitled to enjoy the assets belonging to the trust. The trust is not a contract but
it is created through a unilateral declaration of will made by the owner of prop-
erty (settlor). The concept of trust is used in the company liw, in the law o? rrr.-
cession, in family law etc.
The trust, as it is understood under the common law does not exist in civil
1aw.35 Instead civil law uses various legal institunons (fiducia, fondation,Treuhand)
e- Pepvic, Civil Law and Common l^aw: Two Dfferent Paths Leading to the Same Goal, ppp god. 40 (2001), 155,
In American law, the rules on transfer of property are very similar. The general rule is that
property is transferred when the parties so intend (UCC sect.2-401 (1). \ y'hen there is an explic-
it agreement "title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completei his
performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods" (uCC sect. 2-401 0).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARy (6th Ed. West publishing Co. 1990) 1509.
see, s. Grundmann, Trust and rreuhand at the End of the 20th Century. Key problems and
shift of Interests, AICL 401 (1999), M. Milo & J. smits, Trusts in Mixed t-egal systems: A
Challenge to Comparative Trust Law, European Rea. prioate L.421 e000.
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which can serve some of the functions the trust has in common law However,
all these institutions of civil law can never achieve all functions of the commonlat trust without profound changes of the civil law concepts related to proper-
ty. In civil law, there are serious difficulties for a potentiil trustee deminding
conveyance of trust property to himself, or to register himself as the owner of th6
property, as he may not be regarded as the owner of the property under civil law.
Mortgage and Hypotheque
The civil law hypotheque differs from the common law mortgage, particu-
larly that it confers on the hypothecary creditor no immediate right to possession
of the property, but only a right against the proceeds of sale of the property after
enforcement of the right in judicial proceedings. The common law mortgage, on
the other hand, gives and immediate right of property to the mortgagee, who
can take possession of the property by a simple notice, without the necessity of
taking suit, as well as a right of foreclosure at law.
under common law, when foreclosure process is completed and the mort-
gagor failed to pay his debt to the mortgagee, from that moment the mortgagor
has lost his property right and the mortgagee obtains the absolute control of the
property. As a consequence, the mortgagor's right to recover his property is
extinguished and the mortgagee can exercise all property rights. on the other
hand, under civil law the mortgagor remains the owner of the property until the
purchaser obtains ownership, and the mortgagee acquires property only of the
money paid by the purchaser in the amount of his claim plus interest.
Bills of Exchange
There are two main legal systems which regulate the law of bills of exchange.
First group covers the countries which adopted the Geneva uniform Law on
Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, 1930, which is mainly based on French
and German law. This system is adopted in most civil law countries. Second sys-
tem applies in common law countries and is based on the English Bills of
Exchange Act, 1,882, and the American Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act,
1896, which was later replaced by sect.3 of the UCC. Between these two systems
there are some important differences. Here are some illustrations.
As compared to the civil law system, in the common law system the bill of
exchange is not subject to such strict rules regarding its form and content. For
example, while under art. 1 of the Geneva Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange,
1930 the term "bill of exchange" has to be inserted in the document, no such
requirement exists in common law system.
In common law there is a special kind of bill of exchange called "promissory
note". A promissory note contains an unconditional promise whereby the maker
t9
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undertakes to pay a definite sum of money to the payee or to his order. The
promissory note can be distinguished from the bill of exchange mainly because
it contains a direct promise of payment by the person who signs it, instead of an
order directing a drawee to pay. So, in case of promissory notes, there is no
drawee involved.
In civil law the bill of exchange is strictly an abstract document, which means
that the obligations arising from the document are unconditional and cannot be
connected with obligations from other documents. So, under art. 26 of the
Geneva Uniform Law, the acceptance of a bill of exchange is unconditional.
Under common law the obligation from a bill of exchange can be made subject
to performance of another obligation.36
Under Geneva Uniform Law a bill of exchange can be issued on order only,
while under common law a bill of exchange can be issued on bearer.3t
Under art. 30 of the Geneva Uniform Law payment of a bill of exchange may
be guaranteed by a special kind of guarantee instrument called "aval" . An aaal
is given by a signature of the giver of this guarantee on the bill of exchange. The
arral should also specify for whose account it is given. The giver of an aaal is
bound in the same manner as the person for whom he guarantees. In the
common law system, there is no this kind of special kind of guarantee, but the
guarantee relating to bills of exchange is governed by the general principles of
suretyship."
IV CIVIL PROCEDURE
Comparison of Procedural law
Differences in procedural law between the civil law and common law are
even more obvious than those in substantive law. Common law procedure is
usually called "adversarial", which means that the parties in a dispute act as
adversaries leading the proceedings; they have control over proceedings which
they initiate and may decide to terminate them at any point by amicable settle-
ment. The position of judge is rather passive as he or she does not undertake any
independent investigation into the subject matter of the dispute acting as neutral
arbiter between the parties in dispute as they each put forward their case. The
37
38
For example, sect. 19 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 provides that the accePtance may be
conditional.
E.g. sect. 3-109 of the UCC.
see, E.A. Peters, Suretyship under Article 3 of the uniform Commercial Code, YALE L,l.
843 (1968).
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role of judge is not to find the ultimate truth but to oversee the proceedings and
to ensure that all aspects of the procedure are respected. The judge does not him-
self interrogate the witnesses, but his task is to ensure that the questions the par-
ties put to the witnesses are relevant to the case. At the end, the judge should
decide the case according to the more convincing of the competing presentations.
Civil law procedure is usually called "inquisitorial", because the judge is in
control of the proceedings and he or she examines the witnesses, while the par-
ties in dispute practically have no right of cross-examination. Compared to com-
mon law, the judge in civil law plays a more active role in the proceedings, e.g.
by questioning witnesses and formulating issues. This is because the court has
the task to clarify the issues and help the parties to make their arguments. The
judge plays the main role in establishing the material truth on the basis of avail-
able evidence. The judge does not have to wait for the counsels to present evi-
dence, but he or she can actively initiate introducing of relevant evidence and
may order one of the parties to disclose evidence in its possession. The role of a
judge is not merely to decide the case according to the stronger of the competing
presentations, but to ascertain the definite truth and then to make a just decision.
with respect to the resolution of legal issues, the civil law system is based on
the principle jura noait curia ("the Court is supposed to know the law"), which
means that there is no need for parties to plead the law. on the other hand, in
common law the law has to be pleaded, the precedents for or against have to be
submitted and distinguished.
The use of the terms "adversarial" and "inquisitorial" is misleading and can-
not help much in identifying the actual differences between the common law
and civil law procedures/ as these two terms could be used for both procedures.rn
In order to find out those differences the more appropriate way is to compare
certain aspects of common law and civil law procedures, such as the way of
determination of facts, service of documents, rules on admission and weight of
evidence, witness statements, position of court experts, standard of proof in civil
and criminal cases, etc.
Determination of Facts
While in common law system ihe parties and the court first investigate the
facts in order to establish the truth, in civil law system the court is mainly con-
} The use of the adjective "inquisitoriaf' has a negative connotation, referring to the notori-
ous Spanish Inquisition, known for its use of torture in obtaining confessions. The term
"adversarial" applied to the common law procedures would be more appropriate, as the
core of the both civil law and common law proceedings is the opposition of contending
parties, while the judge acts as an independent arbitrator. A more active role of the judge
in civil law proceedings does not justify the use of term "inquisitorial".
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cerned with the claims of the parties as they are expressed in the pleadings. In
common law a complaint is merely a formality which starts a procedure of
investigation aimed at establishing the truth. On the other hand, in civil law the
complaint actually determines the parameters of the case.'o Consequently, the
judges in civil law countries will concentrate on the facts which are submitted by
the parties and if the facts as presented by the parties differ, the judge will make
a decision on the basis of the available evidence as presented by the parties.n'"Da
mihi facttm, dabo tibi jus" (give me the facts, I shall give you the law).
The parties, of course, are also active in a civil law trial. The parties are enti-
tled to introduce evidence and propose motions. The parties are allowed to
introduce evidence after providing the other side with an opportunity to inspect.
While the judge makes the initial interrogation of witnesses, the counsels have
the right to make additional questions.
Also, there are important differences between civil law and common law in
the way a trial is conducted. A civil law trial is consisted of a number of hear-
ings, and written communications between the parties, their attorneys and the
judge during which an eventual dispute on court's jurisdiction is resolved, evi-
dence is presented, and motions are made. Compared to the common law sys-
tem, there is less emphasis on oral arguments and examination. Instead, written
communication is prevailing, and if during the trial a new point is raised by one
of the attorneys, the other may ask the court for a certain period of time to
answer that issue in writing.
Service of Documents and Discovery
Another important difference between common law and civil law exists in
the methods of gathering evidence in the pre-trial stage.
In common law, the pre-trial search for evidence is dominated by the process
of discovery. The parties are obliged to produce for inspection by the other party
all documents or information which are relevant to the matters in dispute and
which are in their possession without the intervention of the court, whether or
not the documents favor their claim or defense. Through discovery of docu-
ments, the parties to a dispute can obtain access to facts and information the
adverse party intends to rely on at trial. Thus, discovery enables the parties to
obtain facts and information about the case from the other party, which assists
them in preparing for trial.
According to art. 4 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure "the object of suit is deter-
mined by the respective claims of the parties."
For example, art. 7 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure provides that "the judge
may not base his decision on facts which do not aPPear from the hearing."
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on the other hand, in civil law civil there is no pre-trial discovery. The main
purpose of evidence presented by a party is to prove his or her legal or factual
arguments. Consequently, a party is obliged to produce only those documents
which are referred to in its pleadings. Under civil law, the parties are not oblig-
ed to produce documents voluntarily to the other party during the course of civil
litigation. While in the common law system the parties should collect and intro-
duce evidence, in the civil law system the judge plays the main role in collecting
evidence." If one party wishes to obtain access to documents held by another
party, it will have to ask the court to order the other party to disclose the docu-
ment in question. The parties are bound to co-operate in the investigation, and
"if one party withholds an item of evidence, the judge may, at the request of the
other party, require him to produce it under penalty of a fine."'3 So, while the
common law process of discovery is, generally speaking, a private matter, per-
formed by lawyers in accordance with prescribed procedure, the civil law
process of collecting evidence is a public function conducted by the court. This
is in accordance with the general principle in the civil law system that the court
rather than the parties is in the charge of the process of the development of evi-
dence.
Rules on Admission and Weight of Evidence
The common law contains several rules which restrict admission of evidence.
The main barriers to the production of documentary evidence are: authencity,
the hearsay rule, and the best evidence rule. The requirement of authencity as a
condition precedent to admissibility of evidence is satisfied by evidence suffi-
cient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.no The authencity of a document may be proven in any way, such as hand-
writing verification, oi oral testimony of a person who saw thsdocument exe-
cuted. The admission of the authencity of a document is no evidence that the
content of the document is accurate, nor does it deprive a party of an opportu-
nity to object to its admissibility in evidence. Under the "hearsay" rule, a witness
may not testify about fact of which he or she has no direct knowledge, e.g. about
conversation of other people a witness heard. Under the "best evidence" rule,
the evidence must constitute the best available evidence. In the case of written
documents, the original document must be presented.
43
In criminal procedure there is even a special judge, called the "investigating judge" whose
main task is to investigate all facts for and against the accused person. In the common law
system this kind of judge does not exist.
Art. 11 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure.
Fed.R. Evid. 901
ZJ
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The civil procedure rules in the civil law system contains the rules on evi-
dence which determine what may be introduced as evidence and sets conditions
of admissibility and weight of evidence. However, in the civil law, while there
are some restrictions, there are not rules corresponding to the common law rules
on admissibility such as " hearsay" and "best evidence" rules. In principle, any
evidence is admissible, but the court will evaluate how much weight is to be
accorded to an evidence. Evidence admitted is subject to appeals for factual
error.4s
Witness Statements
There are significant differences between common law and civil law in rela-
tion to witness evidence. One of the basic principles of common law is the cross-
examination of witnesses, which allows a thorough examination of the case. Oral
evidence is given considerable weight and will usually prevail over written evi-
dence. At a common law trial witnesses are examined and cross-examined in the
presence of the judge and jury. Motions and objections are often made orally by
counsels, and the judge rules on orally on them.
In the civil law, on the contrary, written evidence prevails over oral evidence.
If a claim is supported by a document, the judge will usually not go further. If a
document is contradicted by oral statement of a witness the document will nor-
mally prevail. In commercial cases, the use of witness evidence is very unusual.
In some civil law countries, the court may even exclude the evidence given by a
party witness in his or her own case. In criminal cases, most civil law countries
recognize testimonial privilege for potential witnesses drawn from the family.
Cross-examination of witnesses is virtually unknown in civil law. However,
in some civil law countries counsel is allowed to question the witness directly,
while in some other civil law countries counsel can only formulate questions and
ask the judge to put them to the witness.nu The judge has a discretionary dght to
decide whether to ask the proposed questions or not. The judge also has the
power to ask further questions beyond those proposed by the parties, if that is
necessary for establishing the truth. The usual practice in most civil law coun-
tries is that witness testimony in not recorded verbatim, but the judge dictates a
summary of the testimony into the dossier in the judge's own words. Then this
M. DAMASKA,THE FACES OF IUSTICE AND STATE AUTHONTY (New Heaven: Yale
University Press. 1986) 85.
In regard to the examination of witnesses, art. 294 of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedural
combines elements of both the civil law and the common law by providing for direct exam-
ination and cross-examination of witnesses upon petition to the court, in addition to exam-
ination by the court. Direct examination and cross examination was introduced by the 1948
Amendment under the influence of the American law.
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statement is signed by the parties. In common law, this practice would be con-
sidered as a denial of basic procedural fairness.
Another important difference between common law and civil law in relation
to the witness evidence, is so-called "preparation of witnesses". In common law,
the counsels would normally "prepare" their witnesses for the hearing in order
to avoid surprises during the trial and to make sure that the witness statements
are accurate.
In civil law, the preparation of witnesses is strictly forbidden. The attorneys
are normally not allowed to discuss the issues related to trial with witnesses out
of court and may face disciplinary sanctions if they breach this rule. If the judge
is informed that a witness was questioned by the attorney before the trial, the
witness' testimony may not be given full credibility.n'
Court experts and Expert witnesses
The courts often invite experts in certain fields to give testimony on the facts
which require highly technical knowledge, such as engineers, physicians,
accountants, handwriting experts, etc. They are considered as witnesses whose
task is to provide the court with information related to a specialized area.
In common law, the experts are appointed and paid by the parties. Therefore,
the experts are usually partial and their task is to support the position of the
party who appointed them. Like other witnesses, they are examined and cross-
examined by attorneys.
On the other hand, the experts in a civil law trial are not considered as wit-
nesses and they are usually called "court's experts". The court experts are
appointed by the court from a list of experts registered with the court, not by the
parties, and they are expected to be impartial. The courts often rely ori expert
opinion, and many cases are decided mainly on the basis of expert evidence. The
expert is usually instructed by the court to prepare a written opinion, which is
then circulated to the attorneys. The parties may demand the court to order the
expert to come to the court's hearing, so that they can interrogate the expert and
ask him to explain the conclusions contained in the report. If one of the parties
objects to the expert opinion, or the court finds the expert's report unsatisfacto-
ry, the court may appoint another expert. A party may propose a particular
expert but the court may reject this proposal and select another expert.n8
o' B. Kaplan, A. T. von Mehren & R. Schaefe4, Phases of German Civil Procedure I,
H ARV.L.REV. L201 ( 1.9 5 8 ).
'' ld. aI 124i.
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Effect of a Criminal |udgment on Subsequent Civil Proceedings
When one wrongful act serves as basis for both civil and criminal liability,
among common law and civil law systems there are some important difference
related to the effect of a criminal judgment on subsequent civil proceedings.
In common law, the rule is that in a civil action facts in issue cannot be proved
by reference to previous criminal proceedings.on In civil proceedings, the crimi-
nal judgment is not admitted as evidence of the facts established by it, even
against the person who is a party in both proceedings. Hence, the civil court is
free to decide differently from the criminal court even if the facts of the case are
the same. It is important to note that in common law, there is a difference of stan-
dard of proof in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases the plaintiff is required to
prove a "balance of probabilities" or "preponderance of evidence", which means
to prove that what is sought to be proved is more likely true than not. In crimi-
nal cases the standard of evidence is "beyond reasonable doubt" which is much
stricter.
In many civil law jurisdictions a criminal judgment has the force of a conclu-
sive evidence and binds the whole world.'oCriminal jurisdiction is regarded as
superior to civil jurisdiction (le criminel emporte sur le ciail), and civil courts are
bound by the decisions of criminal courts. Actually, there is often a direct link
between the criminal fault and the civil tort liability: the conviction in a criminal
case may serve as a basis for the award of damages in a civil tort case.
Differently from common law, in civil law the standard of proof is the same
for both criminal and civil cases. Also, under civil law, there is no distinction
between criminal and civil negligence, so if the criminal court has acquitted a
person of negligence, the civil court will be bound by this judgment. However,
there are some exceptions and limits to this principle. For example, if the crimi-
nal court has acquitted a person of liability in a criminal case, the civil court is
free to hold that person civilly liable under the rule of strict liability. Also, in
some civil cases (e.g. cases related to traffic accidents), the civil court is not
bound by the views of the criminal court related to the extent of the damage suf-
fered by a plaintiff.
Attachment and Saisie Conservatoire
Under American law, the plaintiff can rely on attachment for securing its
claim against defendant before the court renders the judgment.s'Attachment is
o' Hollington v. Hewthorn [1943] K.B.587 (C.A.).
a RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 1., at 497.
5' Fed.R.Civil P.64.
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the legal process of seizing the defendant's property in accordance with a writ
or judicial order for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the judgment in the
event the suit succeeds. While under English law there is no aitachment, the
Mareva injunction, introduced into English law in 1975, has similar effect.52
Mareva injunction prohibits the defendant, before or during a suit, from remov-
ing assets from the jurisdiction or from dealing with them when it appears to the
court that without such an order the plaintiff's recovery on his claim will be
imperiled, It is merely a court order freezing assets and it does not relate to the
merits of the case.
Under French law, saisie conseraatoire permits any property of the debtor to be
seized and detained by the court pending judgment. The judgment in favor of
claimant can be enforced against the attached property. Similarly to attachment
in American law, but differently from Mareva injunction, saisie conseraatoire
places the defendant's assets under the court's authority so as to permit their
judicial sale in order to enforce the judgment allowing the claim.
Maritime law offers an interesting comparison of effects of the civil law and
common law versions of attachment. In maritime law there are two types of
action: in personam and in rem.While action in personam is common to any juris-
diction or branch of law, action in rem is virtually unknown outside maritime
law. An action in rem literally means "against the thing". This suit is filled
against the vessel itself and can be brought even though the owner has no per-
sonal liability, e.g.supplies ordered by a chartereq, or collision or marine pollu-
tion caused by the master or crew employed by the bareboat charterer. Thus, the
liability of ship is personalized and may exist independently of the liability of
shipowner.
In civil law, the arrest of a ship is a kind of pre-trial attachment; a ship may
be arrested either to enforce a maritime lien or a personal claim against the
owner. In both cases the action is directed against the owner personally and
never against a ship. Differently from the attachment under common lbw, saisie
conseraatoire can be applied to property other than ships and ships can be arrest-
ed for most civil claims, not only maritime.
V. RAPPROCHEMENT OF COMMON tAW AND CIVIL LAW
During the period of national codification many divergent legal systems
were established, which proved to be an obstacle to the world economic inte-
gration. Since the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th century started the
'2 Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulkcarrriers S.A. t19751 2 Lloyd's 509.
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Process of unification and harmonization of law especially in the fields of inter-
national private and public law. The growing globalisation of the world econo-
my, based on closer integration and cooperation among states, imposed a need
for legal certainty and unification of law, so that an eventual dispute could be
solved in the same way regardless of what court decides it and whit law applies
to it. This Process involved reducing differences between various legal syiiems
and an approaching between common law and civil law legal systems.53 As an
illustration of this rapprochement, English law has introduced contracts for ben-
efit of third parties by adopting the Contracts (Rights of Third parties) Act,1999,
while the ]apanese Code Civil Procedural provides for possibility of direct exam-
ination and cross-examination of witnesses.
The binding force of precedents, as one of the main distinctive features of
common law, is not so unique to the common law as it may seem, because of the
actual influence the case law has on the courts in all legal systems.il In some civil
law countries the decisions of supreme courts have been made binding by
statute. Even in the countries where the decisions of higher courts are not for-
mally binding, they are likely to be followed by lower courts. on the other hand,
the rigidity of the stare decisis doctrine has been softened by a number of changes
in the common law countries, including the famous Practice Statement by the
House of Lords, which declared that it considered itself no longer formally
bound by its own precedents.ss whether courts are bound or not by precedents,
judges in all legal systems are aware that the need of reasonable certainty and
predictability requires that like cases be treated alike. Hence, in contemporary
civil law the role of judges in the creation of law is increasingly important, while
the difference between civil law and common law courts shows a tendency of
disappearing, or at least looking less significant. The presence or absence of a
formal doctrine of stare decisis does not have crucial importance and it may be
expected that differences between the common law and civil law systems in this
area will diminish over time.s
5r The mutual influence and mixing of civil law and common law elements has created mixed
legal systems in several parts of the world, like Scotland, South Africa, Quebec, Louisiana,
Puerto Rico, Sri Lanka, etc.
a D. N. MACCORMICK & R. S. SUMMERS (eds.),/NTEMRETING PRECEDENTS; ACOM-
PARATM STUDY (Aldershot: Darmouth Publishing C o.Ltd. 1,997). National reports from
several civil countries contained in this book indicate to an increasing importance of prece-
dent in civil law system. For example, according to reporters on German law (R. Alexy &
R. Dreier, Precedent in the Dederal Republic of Germany, at 77,2$ between 97Vo and 99Vo oljudicial decisions in Germany make reference to precedent, while in France lawyers and
the advocate-general discuss precedents extensively in their filings (M. Troper & C.
Crzegorczyk, Precedent in France, at 103, 112).
ij See, supra note 7 .
ft M. A. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 1 at 208.
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On the other hand, large sections of common law have been regulated by
statutes and even codes (e.g. the UCC). This proliferation of statute law in the
common law system has narrowed the court's power of interpretation. Modern
common law courts also tend to give greater weight to the problem of individu-
alized justice in the particular case instead of trying to provide guidance for the
future.sT This tendency makes the role of common law courts similar to that
played by the civil law courts.
An important step towards bringing together the civil law and the common
law has been made through adopting international treaties, conventions and
uniform rules containing elements of both the civil law and the common law.
Such an example is the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, which was adopted by
both the civil law and the common law countries."The UNIDROIT Principles for
International Commercial Contracts represent another attempt at bridging dif-
ferences between the civil law and the common law. s' Differently from the
Vienna Convention, the UNIDROIT Principles are not intended to become bind-
ing law, but they are aimed to serve as a model to national legislators and to pro-
vide guidance to courts and arbitrators when interpreting existing uniform law
and deciding disputes relating to international commercial contracts. As result
of the attempts to reconcile differences between the civil law and the common
law, the Vienna Convention and UNIDROIT Principles contain some identical
provisions.* The 2000 INCOTERMS provides an additional set of rules which
uniformly regulates the transfer of risk and costs in contracts of sale, thus avoid-
ing inconveniences which may arise from differences between the civil law and
the common law. There are similar examples in other fields of law, like interna-
tional carriage of goods, international payments, international commercial arbi-
tration, etc.
Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process
and the Law, IOWAL. REV. (1980) 1250.
See, J. O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNAT/ONAL SALES (3rd Ed. Kluwer
Law International 1999); P. SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMEIJTARY ON THE UN CONyEN-
TION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) (Clarendon Press - Oxford,
1998).
On the UNIDROIT Principles see, for example, UNIDROIT Principles for International
Commercial Contracts: A New Lex Mercatoria? 0CC Publishing S.A. 1995).
For example, art. 16 of the Vienna Convention and art. 2.4 of the UNIDROIT Principles pro-
vide that the offer can be revoked until the moment a contract is concluded "if the revoca-
tion reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an acceptance". However, an offer cannot
be revoked if it indicates that it is irrevocable, or if it was reasonable for an offeree to rely
on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer (art. 15,
2). First exception is based on the civil law system, while the second exception is based on
the common law (estoppel).
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The creation of European union (EU) law greatly contributes to the process
of rapprochement between common law and civil law.6' The EU has brought
together different legal systems under a single legislature, especially after 7973,
when the uK and Ireland joined the EU. The membership of these common law
countries, in addition to all other civil law countries opened the way for conver-
gence within the EU of common law and civil law elements and creation of a
common legal framework. The process of European integration and the
supremacy of Community law over national law represents a driving force lead-
ing to the creation of a mixed legal system which contains elements of both civil
law and common law systems.
The EU has been very active in adopting a great number of regulations and
directives which have precedence over national laws. These legislation of EU
often incorporate elements specific for either civil law or common law There are
several examples of common law elements incorporated in the EU law like the
concept of true and fair view in accounting law62 The European Parliament has
adopted several resolutions calling for unification of private law, especially in
the areas relevant to the development of common market.* Also, the
Commission on European Contract Law (the Lando Commission) has prepared
the Principles of European Contract Law, which attempt to reconcile the differ-
ences between the civil law and the common law.s. These Principles presently
have the status of 'soft law', but they may be the forerunner of a European Civil
Code which would greatly contribute to the further convergence of civil law and
common law.65
W. Van Gerven, ECf Case-Law as a Means of Unification of Private Law,2 EUROPEAN
REVIEW OF PNUATE LAW (1.997) 293,
Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 on the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of
Companies, 1978 O.l. (L 222).
For example, Resolution on Action to Bring into line the Private Law of the Member States,
1989 O.l. C1581400, and Resolution on the Harmonization of Certain Sectors of the Private
Law of the Member States, 1994 O.l. C2051518.
See, O. LANDO & H. BEALE (eds), PRINCIPLES OF EUROPE,4N CONTRACT LAW
(Kluwer, The Hague, 2000).
As an illustration of attempts to reconcile differences between the civil law and the com-
mon law, art.2:.202 of the Principles regulates the revocation of offers almost identically
with art. 16 of the Vienna Convention and art. 2.4 of the LINIDROIT Principles (see supra
note 60).
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VI. CONCTUSION
The examination of common law and civil law reveals that there are more
similarities than differences between these two legal systems, Despite very dif-
ferent legal cultures, processes/ and institutions, common law and civil law have
displayed a remarkable convergence in their treatment of most legal issues.
Under the contemporary pressure of globalisation, modern civil law and
common law systems show several signs of convergence. Many of the differ-
ences that used to exist between the civil law and common law systems are now
much less visible due to the changes which have occurred both in common law
and civil law. In the common law, regulatory law has achieved a greater impor-
tance leaving less room for the courts, while in the civil law the role of the courts
in the creation of law has greatly increased. As a result of these processes going
to opposite directions, many of the differences between common law and civil
law look now more like nuances rather than major differences.
The differences which exist between civil law and common law should not be
exaggerated. It is also important to note that differences on many issues exist
both among civil law and among common law countries. The differences
between civil law and common law systems are more in styles of argumentation
and methodology than in the content of legal norms. By using different means/
both civil law and common law are aimed at the same goal and similar results
are often obtained by different reasoning. The fact that common law and civil
law, despite the use of different means arrive at the same or similar solutions is
not surprising, as the subject-matter of the legal regulation and the basic values
in both legal systems are more or less the same.
While a certain rapprochement between civil law and common law systems
is evident and this tendency will continue, there are still important differences
which will continue to exist for an indefinite period. This paper has given sev-
eral examples of these differences between the common law and civil law sys-
tems. An awareness of these differences is necessary for any lawyer dealing in
international law. The differences in some areas are substantial and the parties
contemplating starting proceedings in another legal system are advised to check
those differences before taking action.
The aim of this paper was not to judge which legal system is better: civil law
or common law. The task of lawyers should not be to defend their legal systems,
but to improve them. Each legal system may have some advantages and defi-
ciencies. If a foreign legal system has some advantages, why not incorporate
them in our domestic legal system? In that way the resulting convergence of the
two legal systems can only contribute to their common goal of creating a fair and
just legal system which can provide legal certainty and protection to all citizens
and legal persons.
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Saietak
" UV L LAW" I " CO MMON LAW" : DVA RAZLIEITA PI]TA D O I ST OG A CILI A
usporedioanje kontinentalnog i anglo-ameriikag prar:nog sistema je tema kojn nije
n.eposredno iz oblasti pomorskog praua, aet se prije radi o iemi komparntianog'p*io
Autor se odluiio obraditi oau temu nakon ito se ploaeii oko daa'desetljeta"aodama
pomorskog praaa iesto susretao, a poneknd bioao i iznenaden, drugaiijim pristttpom
kojeg imaiu oaa daa u saijetu dominantna pranna sistema. Ooaj rad ie baai samo nekim
od brojnih razlikn izmedu.kontinentalnog i anglo-ameriikog prarsa u oblasti materijalnog
i procesnog praaa. U dijelu koje se baai razlikama u oblasti materijalnog praaa, kao ilui-
tracija su izabrane nelce od razlika u oblasti ugloora, soojine i trgoaaikog praaa, dok dio
koji se baai procesnim razliknma obruduje ulogu suda u parniinom poitupku, doknzni
postupak, sasluianje sajedoka i sudskih ajeitakn, djelooanje kriuiine presude na
gradansko-parniini postupak i priaremene mjere.l,I zakljuinom dijelu autor ukazuje na
tede.nciju pribliiaaanja izmedu kontinentalnog i anglo-amerifkog praaa kno rezukat
g_lobalizaciie saietske priarede,koja nameie potrebu praane sigurnoiti i unifikncije praaa.
Kao dokaz oae tendencije, autor naaodi pokuiaje da se u anglo-ameridcom praau kodifi-
ciraju neke oblasti praaa, dok u kontinentalnom praau istiie iinjenicu da se sudoai iae
aiie oslanjaju na sudsku praksu. Autor takoder naaodi neke primjere pribliiaaanja kon-
tinentalnog i anglo-ameriikog pratsa kno rezultat unifikacije i harmonizacije prana, kao
ito su Beikn konaencija o medunarodnoj prodaji robe,lrNlDRolr principi koji se prim-jenjuju na medunarodne trgoaad<e ugoaore i konaencije u oblasti pomorskog pruaa. Na
kraju, autor ukazuje na promjene u praT)nom sistemu Europske unije, koje-ukazuju na
koriitenje elemenata kontinentalnog i anglo-ameriikog praaa, ito doprinosi smanjenju
razlika izmedu oaa doa sistema. Autor skrete painju da usprkos znaiajnim razliknma
koje joi uaijek postoje izmedju kontinentalnog i anglo-ameriikog praaa, i kojih praanici
koji se baae medunarodnim praaom moraju biti sijesni, postoji jasna tendincija k pri-
bliiaaanju oaa dus glaana sajetska praana sistema. Autor zakljuiuje da je to pribliin-
aanje logiino zbog sliinosti odnosa koje oai praani sistemi reguliraju, kao i sliinih
kriterija arijedosti.
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